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COMMENT
ALIEN ETHICS:
TESTING THE LIMITS OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Yasha Rennert
I. INTRODUCTION

The student of history knows that our Western civilization is the story of
Christendom and its great work in Europe.' Imperial Rome is thought to
have suffered a violent death at the hands of foreign invaders, yet by all
credible accounts it was transformed from within. Indeed, the decay of the
Roman Empire became the fertile soil from which the European nations
emerged;2 and by the Middle Ages, there had been a continuity of European
civilization, under the discipline and moral authority of the Catholic
Church, for over a thousand years.' It was during this period that powerful
minds would affirm that final end of man, which is (and shall ever be)
happiness.' That freedom should be exercised in the pursuit of happiness is
a familiar concept in the Land of the Free.' But the medieval man was
taught a truer doctrine than we, for he was, in a sense, the firstborn of faith
and reason, and therefore heir to the greatest flowering of philosophy the

t Submissions Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 7. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2013); B.S., Portland State University (2006). This paper is
dedicated to my wife, Denise, and our Lydie Bug.
1. See John 14:12 (English Standard Version) ("[G]reater works than these will he
do... ."). Subsequent citations to Holy Scripture are to the ESV unless otherwise indicated.
2. There is a short-lived exception in the case of the Roman province of Britain, whose
silence between the middle of the fifth century until the landing of St. Augustine and his
missionary priests in A.D. 597 has become the source of many unhistorical speculations
generally described as the "Anglo-Saxon conquest." For an account of that period of Britain's
history, and of the history of Europe generally, see HILAIRE BELLOC, EUROPE AND THE FAITH
70-101 (Dodo Press 2007) (1920).
3. Id. at 108-09. Indeed, it was the Catholic Church, and not the popular and false
explanation of barbarian invasion, which transformed the old Roman order, thoroughly
Pagan, into a unified Christian civilization. Id. at 51.
4. See, e.g., 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA bk. I. pt. II. Q.1, art. 7, sed
contra (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (c. 1265).
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.").
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world has ever known. It was not to last, however, and by the eighteenth
century, the children of an older Europe, now fathers of a nation, came to
inherit the tired remains of a supernatural ethic, which these men raised as
the banner of their newly minted government. That flag still flies today,
though its colors have since faded.
"Happiness" is a universal calling, as varied as life itself. But humanity
errs if it concludes that "happiness" is simply subjective, merely relative, or
without transcendent meaning. Even happiness has its limits, which
common sense since birth has taught us. The truth is we ought not indulge
our heart's every urge, as the prophets of old had warned.6 Happiness, we
learn, is not the same as pleasure;7 one is spiritual, the other sensual. Thus,
the mystery of freedom is counted among those paradoxes for which the
Christian faith is known, often attacked, and has made its business to
defend against the errors of every age. As one esteemed writer has recently
reminded us, "Liberty is a power perfecting man, and hence should have
truth and goodness for its object."' The paradox, then, is simply this: that
man is most free when he knows his limits-and walks -within them.
Therefore, if authentic liberty be our guide, the way is narrow indeed, but it
is the only way which secures our happiness.'
This principle is fundamental, but especially so to the criminal law,
which is chiefly concerned with judging human actions that have strayed
from the straight and narrow. Consequently, the law's machinery is
generally tooled to operate along the cliffs of human nature; that is, where
the use of freedom is safely viewed by all as immoral. In all cases, however,
freedom is the key to culpability. Thus, it is said that coercion will in some
cases excuse an unlawful act,'o since coercion is contrary to freedom," the
exercise of which is an essential catalyst of crime and therefore punishment.

6. Jeremiah 17:9-10.
7. Many ethical writers have confused the two. The errors of utilitarianism, a
philosophy of ethics in opposition to the classical notion of virtue, is one such example. See,
e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1-24 (Prometheus
Books 1988) (1789).
8. LEO XIII, IMMORTALE DEI para. 32 (Nov. 1, 1885), reprinted in THE PAPAL
at
available
(1990),
107,
114
at
1878-1903
ENCYCLICALS
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/leo-xiii/encyclicals/documents/hfI-xiiienc 01111885i
mmortale-dei en.html.
9. See Matthew 7:14.
10. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 438-39 (photo. reprint 2005)
(2d ed. 1960).
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But not all coercion does violence to freedom, otherwise law itself would
be a nullity. In the American tradition, as with the Western legal tradition
in general, the goal of government is the "public good."I2 To this end laws
are promulgated, their power coercive." In the United States, however,
government finds its source in the people." Thus, under the American form
of government, freedom is, in theory," bound by majority rule," save those
subjects which the people have expressly withdrawn from government's
competence.
But even without the legislator and the coercive power of human law,
there is another lawgiver and another law-a higher law-that tugs on our
conscience. If human nature was in perfect accord with God's higher law,
then a sort of supernatural justice would be the hallmark of the living: love

11. "Actus me invitofactus non est meus actus, an act done by me against my will is not
my act ..... " JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 288 (7th ed.
1882) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3; see also 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I.
pt. II. Q.90, art. 2.
13. Frederic Bastiat defined law as force in defense of the collective right to life, liberty,
and property. See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 6, 24, 28 (Dean Russell trans., The Found. for
Econ. Educ., Inc. 1950) (1850).
14. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 ("Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.").
15. The political theory of social contract is contrary to St. Paul's doctrine. See Romans
13:1-2 (teaching that the power of ruling comes from God); see also LEO XIII, supra note 8,
paras. 24-26 (criticizing the social contract theory of government). "[Tihe pact which they
allege is openly a falsehood and a fiction," says Pope Leo XIII, "and that it has no authority to
confer on political power such great force, dignity, and firmness as the safety of the State and
the common good of the citizens require." LEO XIII, DIUTuRNuM para. 12 (June 29, 1881),
reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS, supra note 8, at 53, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/leo..xiii/encyclicals/documents/hfIxiiienc_29061881_diuturnumen.html.
16. But see HILAIRE BELLOC, AN ESSAY ON THE RESTORATION OF PROPERTY 31 (2002)
("Parliaments have everywhere proved irreconcilable with democracy. They are not the
people. They are oligarchies, and those oligarchies are corrupt because they pretend to a false
character and to be, or to mirror, the nation."). Hilaire Belloc is a notable historian and
ardent defender of private property and true economic freedom, as opposed to industrial
capitalism, which has plunged both England and the United States back into the ancient
institution of slavery. See also G. K. CHESTERTON, THE OUTLINE OF SANITY 7 (1927) ("The
truth is that what we call Capitalism ought to be called Proletarianism. The point of it is not
that some people have capital, but that most people only have wages because they do not
have capital.").
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would be the rule, and all would freely abide by it. Of course, it is not that
simple. Freedom has been polluted and man's will weakened. "[W]hen I
want to do right," the Apostle complains, "evil lies close at hand. For I
delight in the law of God, in my inner being, but I see in my members
another law waging war against the law of my mind . . "" That "other" law
is a natural craving for pleasure, a kind of coercion from within, which
often comes into conflict with our spiritual good." When that happens a
struggle ensues; to yield is to sin. It is a life-long struggle that engages us.
The taming of that wild and freedom-filled creature called Man is one
reason for the law of crimes. Admittedly, the law is powerless to absolve us
of our sins. Yet, for some, its avenues point the way back to basic freedoms
and, hopefully, the road to forgiveness. For the vast majority, however, the
law stands as a living sentinel, the immortal guardian of civilization, whose
promise of public vengeance, fueled by the memory of a moral tradition
centuries in the making, preserves every generation in relative safety and
happiness.
Nevertheless, the modern world has changed dramatically in the last two
hundred years, and it continues to do so at a frantic pace. The memory of
older things, better things, has faded in so much novelty and blind progress,
or has dissolved in the emptiness of skepticism. As societies become
increasingly complex so do their laws, and the strain on legal systems to
provide for the common good are pressed to their natural limits. Ironically,
however, the growing number of laws invoking the primitive doctrine of
absolute liability are both sign and symptom of our civilization's drift back
to barbarism. These so-called "public welfare offenses" represent a
dangerous departure from established principles of crime and punishment,
settled throughout all Europe by the High Middle Ages.
This Comment examines the constitutional limits of the public-welfareoffense doctrine, which, since its formal recognition in the mid-nineteenth
century, has snowballed into a very real menace. It is difficult to imagine
any conduct that cannot be proscribed and therefore punished by the police
power; and the only effective limits thus far seem to be the ancient
requirements of legality and proportionality. But the latter is on shaky

17. John 13:34 ("A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another: just as I
have loved you, you also are to love one another.").
18. Romans 7:21-23.
19. Galatians 5:17 ("For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of
the Spirit are against the flesh, for these are opposed to each other, to keep you from doing
the things you want to do.").
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ground and would benefit from entrenchment. The rule of construction
recognized in Morissette v. United States20 has been helpful when a statute is
silent as to mental elements; and Lambert v. California2 1 has certainly
slowed the doctrine's progress for crimes of omission. But these two modest
roadblocks cannot defend against the urgent pace and direction the United
States is headed.
This Comment suggests, first, that the doctrine of mens rea with respect
to traditional crime should be protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment-the state cannot alter the fundamental nature of
crime. Second, public welfare offenses that are sufficiently grave violate the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, unless the state proves,
under the test proposed in this Comment, that such laws are legitimate
exercises of the police power. Third, the willful offender's actual knowledge
of a public welfare offense is always sufficient for conviction, and therefore
constitutional in all circumstances, so long as other constitutional
requirements are satisfied. We turn now to the concept of crime.
II. BACKGROUND

Until relatively recent times, the criminal law in England and the United
States was primarily concerned with establishing the moral guilt or
innocence of the accused. Punishment in the early cases was severe and
often deadly; thus, the law grew sensitive to the rights of the accused. That
sensitivity fueled its central inquiry: mens rea.22 Like a magician, the law's
main act was a revelation, the very faculty of freedom in a flash of light and
puff of smoke. (The fact of its existence was itself a revelation long ago.) But
today's criminal law is quickly losing interest in the show; it is growing up,
or so it thinks. Magic is an amusement fit for children but not the modern
rascal, infinitely skeptical of all things supernatural. In time, such doubting
is certain to penetrate even the natural order. Thus, the mature skeptic who
first declared that all magic is superstition now campaigns for the abolition
of all magicians. Meanwhile, the magician patiently waits for the believer,
practicing his art with the knowledge that law is not invention; law is magic.
Sir William Blackstone believed in magic. "[T]o constitute a crime against
human laws," he writes, "there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly,

20. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
21. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
22. Mens rea is a Latin phrase that means "guilty mind." In the context of criminal law,
it generally signifies the mental element necessary to convict for any crime.
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an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will." 23 The visible and
invisible coalesce in Blackstone's doctrine. To understand it, we turn once
more to the medieval man, whose metaphysics would become the
foundation for the common law of crimes.
A. A Tradition Rooted in Antiquity
We begin our story a mere century after the onset of the Middle Ages
and with the Leges Henrici Primi,24 compiled about the year 1118. The Leges
has been described as one of the earliest compilations of "true English law
that was neither Roman nor canon law."25 Despite this potentially
misleading description,2 6 the Leges is purportedly an effort to translate into
Latin the legal codes of the Anglo-Saxon kings, whose settlements along
Britain's eastern shore severed the Roman province from continental
23. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
24. LEGES HENRICI PRIMI (L. J. Downer ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1972) (c. 1118).
25. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 978 (1932).
26. The statement suffers from a modern notion of nationalism. In the twelfth century,
however, no such feeling existed among the peoples of Western Europe. Moreover, Professor
Sayre's description of the Leges echoes the unhistorical thesis that Britain, and therefore
English civilization, became a barbaric and German thing, and this since the middle of the
fifth century. See supra note 2. It is professed by the following distortions of history that the
institutions common to all Europe during the decline of Roman civilization were, in Britain,
the product of a wholly new order, German in origin, which conquered the Roman province
by the combined violence of its Pagan neighbors to the north and bands of local pirates long
remembered by the name of "Saxon." BELLOC, supra note 2, at 80-81, 100. In his lectures on
the common law, Pollock likewise speaks of the virtues of his "heathen ancestors" and their
lasting influence on the isle. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW 8-11

(photo. reprint 2003) (1912). But as truth would have it, Britain survived that period of
random warfare and institutional decline, 150 years in all, with but few novelties added,
namely, the admixture of German with Latin dialects, or what is called "Teutonic." BELLOC,
supra note 2, at 86, 94-95. "By the time that this old Roman province of Britain re-arises as
an ordered Christian land in the eighth century," writes Belloc, "its records are kept not only
in Latin but in the Court 'Anglo-Saxon' dialects . ... " Id. at 101. But no permanent break in
the continuity of European civilization was thereby effected. Professor Berman also
perpetuates this false thesis throughout his book Law and Revolution, which is especially
evident in his discussion of the history of London. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION

381 (1983) ("Although Roman legions had occupied the town from the first to the fifth
centuries A.D., little that was Roman survived the Anglo-Saxon invasions except for the
remains of roads and buildings and the great stone wall."). On the contrary, Belloc explains,
"One thing did not disappear, and that was the life of the towns." BELLOC, supra note 2, at 91.
"The supposition that the Roman towns disappeared is no longer tenable," he continues,
"and the wonder is how so astonishing an assertion should have lived even for a generation."
Id. at 94.
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Europe for 150 years, from the middle of the fifth century until the landing
of St. Augustine and his missionaries in the year 597.27
The Leges contains an assortment of laws, ecclesiastical and secular, and
maxims. Its significance in the study of criminal law stems from its sanction
of absolute liability for a great number of offenses. As Professor Sayre
observes, the Leges contains much law that "smacks strongly of liability
without fault and certainly without criminal intent."2 8 For example, "[i]f
some one in the sport of archery or other form of exercise kill another with
a missile or by some such accident, let him repay; for the law is that he who
commits evil unknowingly must pay for it knowingly."29 Such is the
supposed novelty of the Germanic tribes. But the historian Mr. Hilaire
Belloc teaches otherwise. Money damages for injuries were among the
"institutions .. . common to all Europe. Nothing but ignorance," he says,
"can regard them as imported into Britain ... by the Pirates of the North
Sea.""
Whatever its source, it is a tradition in tension with another, for the Leges
also illustrates the beginning of an ever-growing concern with moral guilt as
a requisite to punishment. Among the many "passages strongly
impregnated with the surviving notion of absolute liability irrespective of
guilty intent," Professor Sayre points out an exception-a "scrap copied in
from the teachings of the church" 3 1-and the object of our inquiry. In a
section discussing perjury, it is said that a person is not guilty unless his
intention is guilty: "Reum non facit nisi mens rea."32 The Latin proverb
27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
28. Sayre, supra note 25, at 979. But see Percy H. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute
Liability, 42 L. Q. REv. 37, 50 (1926) (stating that absolute liability in medieval law is a
"rather inaccurate generalization").
29. Sayre, supra note 25, at 978 (quoting LEGEs HENRICI PRIMI c. 88, 6).
30. BELLOC, supra note 2, at 95.
31. Sayre, supra note 25, at 983. In fact the Leges is littered with such scraps: "No one
shall give the sacrament to a person who delays submitting to the judges he has chosen, until
he obeys." LEGES HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 24, c. 5, 5b. "The apostle says that an accusation
against a priest is not to be entertained without two or three proper witnesses; how many
more then should there be in the case of bishops ... ?"Id. c. 5, 15. "The sins of others shall in
no way be prejudicial to anyone who has led a good life in the church." Id. c. 5, 18d. "There
shall be dealt with first the due rights of the Christian faith; secondly pleas of the crown, and
finally the causes of individuals shall be settled with proper amends." Id. c. 7, 3. "A woman
shall do penance for three years if she intentionally brings about the loss of her embryo
before forty days; if she does this after it is quick, she shall do penance for seven years as if
she were a murderess." Id. c. 70, 16b.
32. Id. c. 5, 28b.
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comes from St. Augustine of Hippo. In a sermon on James 5:12,33 the
Catholic bishop stated to the effect that "if a man believing that no rain fell
in a certain spot, nevertheless for self-interest testifies that it did rain there,
even though in fact it did rain he is a perjurer in the eyes of God.""
Because of the maxim's odd placement in the Leges, however, and due to
the overall disunity of the work, it is thought by some to supply a
contextual, rather than general, rule of liability. 5 Even assuming this is the
case, and as Professor Lvitt concludes, the author of the Leges-himself a
cleric-would have been familiar with "the principle of mens rea as a
necessary ingredient of sin"" through the influence of the penitential
books, 37 particularly those of St. Finnian of Clonard, of the Irish church,
and St. Theodore of Tarsus, the seventh Archbishop of Canterbury."
Indeed, the entire volume is saturated with the truth of Lvitt's thesis.
Appearing under the heading of homicide, for example, one finds that
homicide "is also committed in self-defense or in a just cause,"" followed by
the words of St. Augustine:
If homicide is killing a man, it can sometimes happen without
committing sin; for a soldier who kills his enemy, and a judge a
criminal, and a person from whose hand a spear flies perhaps

33. "But above all, my brothers, do not swear, either by heaven or by earth or by any
other oath, but let your 'yes' be yes and your 'no' be no, so that you may not fall under
condemnation." James 5:12.
34. Sayre, supra note 25, at 983 n.30; accord HALL, supra note 10, at 80 (suggesting that
St. Augustine was the "likely point of dissemination among medieval legal scholars");
Winfield, supra note 28, at 41. And St. Thomas, in his Summa, quotes the Catholic bishop as
having said that "it is by the will that we sin, and we behave aright." 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4,
bk. I. pt. II. Q.20, art. 1, sed contra. St. Thomas thus concludes that "moral good and evil are
first in the will." Id. However, some scholars trace the doctrine, or at least its wider legal
acceptation, to later developments. See, e.g., Albert Ievitt, Extent and Function of the
Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REv. 578, 588-89 (1923) (stating that "the doctrine of mens
rea came into the common law through the penitential books of the Catholic church in
England in the ninth century"); BERMAN, supra note 26, at 181-82.
35. See Winfield, supra note 28, at 40-41; Bernard Brown, The Emergence of the
PsychicalTest of Guilt in Homicide 1200-1550, 1 TAS. U. L.REv. 231, 232 (1959).
36. Albert Ievitt, The Origin of the DoctrineofMens Rea, 17 ILL. L. R. 117, 135 (1923).
37. "The basis of these books are the patristic writings," says Lvitt, and various church
councils. Id. at 132.
38. Id. at 132, 135.
39. LEGEs HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 24, c. 72, lb.
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involuntarily or accidentally, do not seem to me to commit a sin
when they kill a man.o
Therefore, in the context of sin and the ecclesiastical law, the principle of
mens rea seems evident, even advanced. A similar sentiment, equally
antique yet legally sophisticated, is found in a quote from St. Jerome in the
very next sentence: "Punishing murderers and those who commit sacrilege
is not a shedding of blood, but the due application of the laws."4 '
By the late twelfth century, however, men would still resort to the
ordeal42 to adjudge culpability, "as trial by jury or by the oaths of witnesses
was not yet an accredited method of procedure."4 Perjury was
commonplace, as it is arguably even today, and compurgation by oath
therefore invoked the distrust of men accused of capital offenses. The Leges
provided that "[n]o one shall be convicted of the more serious charges on
evidence alone."" "[T]he judicium Dei," says Mr. Edward J. White, "was
supposed to take the place of the false standards, too often erected by
ordinary mortals."4 ' Thus, it would seem that a belief in a guilty mind, and
its theological underpinnings, which had taken firm root by the early
twelfth century, was not yet in harmony with everyday legal procedure."
The doctrine would be merely floating and without foundation in secular
law until the reign of Henry III, who abolished the ordeal throughout
England in response to the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, which
forbade "the clergy to take part in the ceremony of the ordeal."4 1
The onset of the Middle Ages is marked by its emergence from darker
times, in which the old pagan order was slowly purged from Europe by the
40. Id. c. 72, 1c. Professor Sayre seems to be in agreement: "Although the man who
unwittingly caused another's death through pure misadventure may have been criminally
liable under the early Anglo-Saxon law, to punish him with death violated the ideas of moral
guilt derived from the canonists." Sayre, supra note 25, at 980.
41. LEGES HENRICIPRIMI,supra note 24, c. 72, 1d (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See id. c. 18, 1; c. 65, 3, 3a, 3b, 3c, 5; cf Numbers 5:11-31 (the Mosaic law of
jealousies).
43. EDw. J. WHITE, Trial by Ordeal, in LEGAL ANTIQUITIES: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
UPON ANCIENT LAWS AND CUSTOMS 155 (1913).
44. LEGES HENRICIPRIMI,supra note 24, c. 31, 5.
45. WHITE, supra note 43, at 154.
46. Professor Sayre notes that the "growing power of the king" to pardon a convicted
felon was among the first procedural devices with which a felon could escape the death
penalty. Sayre, supra note 25, at 980-8 1.
47. WHITE, supra note 43, at 158 n.57. The ordeal was briefly revived in the reign of
James I. in cases of witchcraft and sorcery. Id.
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Catholic Church. And in the flowering of that high civilization, in which
Europe is said to have awoke, legal institutions were likewise clothed in
greater sophistication. Criminal law, at last, emerged from its pagan shell;
and the learned authors all agree the Church played an important, if not the
leading, role in the development of criminal law."8 The very language of the
law, and the punishments 9 it imposed, invoked the sacramental system.so
For at least eight centuries, however, the Church had provided sinners and
criminals alike with a means of reconciliation with the faithful. The idea was
48. See, e.g., Winfield, supra note 28, at 42 (stating that "the Church's influence [was] at
work"); see also Sayre, supra note 25, at 980 ("The canonists had long insisted that the mental
element was the real criterion of guilt and under their influence the conception of subjective
blameworthiness as the foundation of legal guilt was making itself strongly felt."); BERMAN,
supra note 26, at 188 (discussing categories of intent developed by the canonists).
49. "Anyone who kills a monk or cleric shall give up his arms and enter the service of
God; and if he has done this accidentally and unintentionally, he shall do penance for seven
years; if he did it intentionally he shall do penance until his life's end." LEGEs HENRICI PRIMI,

supra note 24, c. 68, 7. "Anyone who is a party to homicide shall do penance for seven years,
being for one year confined to bread and water." Id. c. 68, 10. "A person who kills any
relative of his shall make amends by the fruits of penitence worthy in the sight of God, and
the measure of penance to be performed shall depend on whether his action was intentional
or unintentional." Id. c. 75, 5.
50. One easily forgets how great were the developments in Christian doctrine arising
out of the Novatian schism. Novatian, a Roman priest, asserted the Church had not the
means to pardon the fallen, who, because of sins committed after baptism, were excluded
from its communion. See JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 384-85 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 6th ed. 2005) (1878). "There

must be some provision in the revealed system for so obvious a need," writes Newman, since
the Sacrament of Baptism could not be repeated. Id. at 384. The controversy was settled by
the end of the third century, at which time "as many as four degrees of penance were
appointed, through which offenders had to pass in order to a reconciliation." Id. at 385. In
modern times, the power to pardon, from which we learn the Latin indulgentia or
indulgence and the grossly misunderstood doctrine going by the same name, is taken for
granted by all democratic nations. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2 ("The President... shall
have Power to grant ... Pardons for Offenses against the United States .... ). Though not a
common practice of the infant Church, see NEWMAN, supra,at 385, 395, Scripture records St.
Paul granting an indulgence to a man guilty of incest. 2 Corinthians2:10 ("For, what I have
pardoned, if I have pardoned any thing, for your sakes have I done it in the person of
Christ.") (Douay-Rheims Version); see also 5 AQUINAS, supra note 4, supp. Q.25, art. 1, sed
contra (concluding that St. Paul could indeed "remit the punishment of a sin without any
satisfaction"; that is, without need of the Sacrament of Penance). Therefore, "whatever
remission is granted in the court of the Church holds good in the court of God." Id. Q.25,
art. 1, respondeo. Ironically, indulgences are today even more prevalent than in the Middle
Ages, for the modern American criminal is often the beneficiary of a relaxed sentence by way
of plea bargaining with the prosecuting official.
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at once liberal and life-giving; and by the twelfth century, the medieval man
would have benefited greatly by the infusion of mercy in a system founded
on a "rough and ready justice.""
What ought we to conclude, then, of the doctrine known as mens rea,
that fundamental principle on which our criminal law is founded? First and
foremost, that it is a Christian doctrine that prompted a kind of spiritual
progress toward the solidarity of the human family. Second, it is a defense
against arbitrary power by the sovereign, who must, at a minimum, show
that a man is deserving of punishment. On these twin pillars medieval life
emerged from its fatalistic adolescence, and yet many continue to doubt the
doctrine's continued vitality.52 However imperfect, the concept of moral
guilt survives today in the halls of secular justice.53

51. Sayre, supra note 25, at 978.
52. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 34, at 588-89 ("A crime does not consist of an act and an
intent, but simply of an act.... [I]n the criminal law of England and the United States there
is no place now for a doctrine of intent as a necessary ingredient of a crime."); HALL, supra
note 10, at 56 (noting the trend in the United States "at present, by psychiatrists, for the
complete elimination of prescribed penalties"). In a manner characteristic of the author, C. S.
Lewis repudiates what he calls the "Humanitarian Theory of Punishment." See C. S. Lewis,
The HumanitarianTheory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 225 (1953) ("My contention
is that this doctrine, merciful though it appears, really means that each one of us, from the
moment he breaks the law, is deprived of the rights of a human being."); see also OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 37 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1963) (1881) ("In the language of Kant, it treats man as a thing, not as a person; as a means,
not as an end in himself.").
53. According to G. K. Chesterton,
The fact is this: that the modern world, with its modern movements, is living
on its Catholic capital. It is using, and using up, the truths that remain to it out
of the old treasury of Christendom; including, of course, many truths known to
pagan antiquity but crystallized in Christendom. But it is not really starting new
enthusiasms of its own. The novelty is a matter of names and labels, like
modern advertisement; in almost every other way the novelty is merely
negative. It is not starting fresh things that it can really carry on far into the
future. On the contrary, it is picking up old things that it cannot carry on at all.
For these are the two marks of modern moral ideals. First, that they were
borrowed or snatched out of ancient or mediaeval hands. Second, that they
wither very quickly in modern hands.
G. K. CHESTERTON, THE THING: WHY I AM ACATHOLIC (1929), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF G. K. CHESTERTON 147 (1990).
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B. Mens Rea in the Modern Era
As shown thus far, the doctrine of mens rea was a development that
arose in the Christian tradition and strengthened in the Middle Ages. Its
primitive formula, however, is easily traced to Jesus' teaching as witnessed
in the Bible:
And [Jesus] said, "What comes out of a person is what defiles
him. Forfrom within, out of the heart of man, come evil thoughts,
sexual immorality, theft, murder, adultery, coveting, wickedness,
deceit, sensuality, envy, slander, pride, foolishness. All these evil
things come from within, and they defile a person."'
The doctrine was later studied, expounded, and systematized in the
scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Bracton was the first conduit to import
Roman law concepts into English criminal law.ss Thus, Professor Sayre
concludes that the Latin phrase found in the Leges of Henry I was merely
"seized upon and used as a convenient label for the newer ideas"" the
Roman law books inspired in legal thought at that time. "Mens rea," he says,
"in the period following Bracton, thus smacked strongly of general moral
blameworthiness."" By the seventeenth century, the doctrine was well
settled as accepted law."
Humanity has struggled with whether evil exists, and why, since the very
beginning. As the successor to a worthy tradition, Anglo-American law has
answered the first question in the affirmative and left the second to better
teachers. Despite the skepticism of our time, the capacity for evil has

54. Mark 7:20-23 (emphasis added).
55. Sayre, supra note 25, at 983 (noting the "Roman law conceptions of dolus and culpa"
influencing Bracton).
56. Id. at 988. But see Ievitt, supra note 36, at 118 (concluding that "mens rea does
not ... come to us from the Roman law").
57. Sayre, supra note 25, at 988.
58. Id. n.51. Evil thoughts alone, however, are generally not cognizable by the criminal
law and, thus, escape punishment by the civil authorities. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note
23, at *21 ("For though, in foro conscientiae,a fixed design or will to do an unlawful act is
almost as heinous as the commission of it, yet, as no temporal tribunal can search the heart,
or fathom the intention of the mind, otherwise than as they are demonstrated by outward
actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it cannot know.... And, as a vicious will without
a vicious act is no civil crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious
will is no crime at all."). As noted elsewhere, the doctrine is not without precedent. See, e.g., 1
Samuel 16:7 (Douay-Rheims Version) ("[N]or do I judge according to the look of man: for
man seeth those things that appear,but the Lord beholdeth the heart.") (emphasis added).
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universally been shown to dwell inside each of us. It is a result of the simple
equation, God plus Man plus Freedom. No longer may we point to Nature
to exculpate us; neither may we claim, "The Devil made me do it," or worse
yet, God. The doctrine of mens rea stands as a testament to that terrible
truth: that we are all free moral agents and therefore responsible to God and
neighbor for our actions. Even legal positivists who advocate a non-moral
theory of penal liability generally admit the moral dimension in which the
criminal law operates. In the words of Justice Holmes, "[T]he fact that
crimes are also generally sins is one of the practical justifications for
requiring a man to know the law."" Nevertheless, for Holmes, the only
reality is that of the outward, visible sign: legal distinctions between
innocent and culpable conduct have nothing to do with the discovery of a
real presence within, what one might loosely refer to as a person's
sacramental innards; instead, the distinctions arose in response to the
uniquely human desire to avenge the victim of intentional violence.
According to Justice Holmes, "Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and
an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done."60
For, as Holmes characteristically observes, "even a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked.""1
59. HOLMES, supra note 52, at 100.

60. Id. at 6-7. Here we see a fine example of the mature skeptic, speaking through Mr.
Justice Holmes, eager to uphold his doctrine by undermining the dignity of man. As is often
the case with genius, it is alarming how an astute thinker like Holmes can come so close to
the truth and miss it completely; it is the tragedy of every man who abandons faith for the
emptiness of materialism. For that is the fundamental problem with putting some things first
which ought to be last. Vengeance does not import a feeling of blame because it is a reaction
to violence, which is first in time; on the contrary, blame (i.e., culpability) imports the need
for lawful vengeance, which today we simply call by a different name-retributive justice. In
the same vein, unrestrained passion is indeed the enemy of the just, see Romans 7:5, 21-23,
and for that reason the power of retributive justice is, in our system of government, first
vested in the state and diffused thence among judge and jury.
Oddly enough, St. Thomas affirms the general notion laid down by Holmes, that
vengeance ought to be confined to intentional wrongs. 3 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. II. pt. II.
Q.108, art. 4, sed contra ("Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary according to
Augustine. Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it
voluntarily.") (internal citation omitted). Vengeance is a special virtue (i.e., a species of
justice), which "consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned." Id. Q.108,
art. 1, respondeo. Paradoxically, then, the lawfulness even of an act of vengeance turns on the
intention of the avenger. Id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
61. HOLMES, supra note 52, at 7. It seems doubtful, however, that the Dumb Ox of Sicily
would have concurred with Justice Holmes's implied assertion that a dog can discern a man's
intention and therefore is presumably capable of vengeance. See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk.
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By the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the maxim actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea62 was oft repeated by legal scholars in both
England and the United States.6 3 The American treatise writer Mr. Bishop
says, "[tihe doctrine which requires an evil intent lies at the foundation of
public justice. There is only one criterion by which the guilt of men is to be
tested. It is whether the mind is criminal."' Likewise, in his treatise on
jurisprudence, Sir John Salmond writes, "there are two conditions to be
fulfilled before penal responsibility can rightly be imposed .... [The first is]
the doing of some act by the person to be held liable.... [The other] is the
mens rea or guilty mind with which the act is done."6' And again, in 1846,
I. pt. II. Q.31, art. 3, respondeo (explaining that irrational animals do not feel joy but only
delight, for joy results "when delight follows reason"); see also id. Q.40, art. 3, respondeo
(proving that, in a limited sense, "hope and despair are in dumb animals").
Thomas was nicknamed the Dumb Ox by his schoolmates on account of his size and
quiet demeanor. According to G. K. Chesterton, when the great Albertus Magnus learned of
his pupil's nickname, he "broke silence with his famous cry and prophecy; 'You call him a
Dumb Ox; I tell you this Dumb Ox shall bellow so loud that his bellowings will fill the
world."' G. K. CHESTERTON, SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 71 (Doubleday 1956). Indeed, the
renowned 13th century scholastic, Doctor of the Church, and the author's hero, is without a
doubt the most brilliant and insightful philosopher to have ever lived. "It was the
outstanding fact about St. Thomas that he loved books and lived on books.... When asked
for what he thanked God most, he answered simply, 'I have understood every page I ever
read.'" Id. at 21. Belloc praises him as "the summit of expository power..., surely the
strongest, the most virile, intellect which our European blood has given to the world."
BELLOC, supra note 2, at 121.
The Angelic Doctor's intellectual pursuits came to an abrupt and miraculous end,
when "[o]n the feast of St Nicholas [in 1273, Thomas] was celebrating Mass when he
received a revelation which so affected him that he wrote and dictated no more, leaving his
great work, the Summa theologiae, unfinished." BUTLER'S LIVES OF THE SAINTS 29 (Michael
Walsh ed., HarperCollins concise rev. ed. 1991) (1756). Said Thomas: "The end of my
labours is come. All that I have written appears to be as so much straw after the things that
have been revealed to me." Id. at 29-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. "[T]he act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so...."
BISHOP, supra note 11, § 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Sayre, supra note 25, at 974.
64. BISHOP, supra note 11, § 287. In a section entitled "Moral Science," Bishop writes,
"The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels." Id. § 289.
65. SIR JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 127 (7th ed. 1924). Salmond continues,
It is not enough that a man has done some act which on account of its
mischievous results the law prohibits; before the law can justly punish the act,
an inquiry must be made into the mental attitude of the doer. For although the
act may have been materially or objectively wrongful, the mind and will of the
doer may have been innocent.

2013]1

ALIEN ETHICS

411

Judge Turley opined, "It is a sacred principle of criminal jurisprudence that
the intention to commit the crime is of the essence of the crime.""
Despite such firm foundations, history has shown that the doctrine of
mens rea is malleable. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, a new kind
of wrongdoing, made to answer under authority of the criminal law, was
being recognized in England and the United States. As one commentator
coined the phrase, "public welfare offenses" 7 formed a new category of
statutory offenses permitting convictions on the basis of conduct alone,
irrespective of guilty intent. They ordinarily carried light penalties and were
enacted for the protection of public health. In his treatise on evidence,
Simon Greenleaf writes of the emerging doctrine:
[W]here a statute commands that an act be done or omitted,
which, in the absence of such statute, might have been done or
omitted without culpability, ignorance of the fact or state of
things contemplated by the statute, it seems, will not excuse its
violation. Thus, for example, where the law enacts the forfeiture
of a ship having smuggled goods on board, and such goods are
secreted on board by some of the crew, the owner and officers
being alike innocently ignorant of the fact, yet the forfeiture is
incurred, notwithstanding their ignorance. Such is also the case
in regard to many other fiscal, police, and other laws and
regulations, for the mere violation of which, irrespective of the
motives or knowledge of the party, certain penalties are enacted;
for the law, in these cases, seems to bind the party to know the
facts and to obey the law at his peril."
Courts and commentators were at once resistant to ascribe the quality of
a true crime" to this new class of statutory offenses, and often justified
convictions on the nature of the proceeding, which, "although ... criminal
in form,... is really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right."70 It is
Id.
66. Duncan v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 148, 150 (1846) (reversing the conviction of a
steamboat captain indicted under Tennessee law for transporting a slave without his
knowledge).
67. Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.REV. 55, 56 (1933).
68. 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 21 (4th ed. 1857).
69. Sayre, supra note 67, at 67 ("One is a class of acts which ... are not criminal in any
real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty." (quoting
Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 at 922 (Eng.))).
70. Id. (quoting Sherras, 1 Q.B. at 922).

412

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:397

noteworthy that the movement began independently in "both England and
the United States at about the same time,"" hence the widely accepted
rationale that it was no "historical accident but the result of the changing
social conditions and beliefs of the day." 7 2
One of the first English cases to dispense with the requirement of mens
rea was Regina v. Stephens, in which the Court of Queen's Bench affirmed
the conviction of the owner of a slate quarry whose workers, without his
knowledge, threw garbage from the quarry into a nearby river and
obstructed it. The Court justified this outcome on the basis that the action
was civil in nature, as a public nuisance, and thus indictment was proper."
By the early twentieth century, all manner of convictions were being
sustained under statutes protecting the public welfare. The English case of
Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. Dunning" upheld the conviction of the
defendant company, whose car was found to be running without a rear light
as required by statutory regulations."6 The Chief Justice began by noting
that the object of the regulation was "for the protection of the public."77 He
then added that "a breach of the regulation is not to be regarded as a
criminal offense in the full sense of the word; that is to say, there may be a
breach of the regulation without a criminal intent or mens rea."78 He
concluded with what has been viewed as the mature doctrine: the
requirement of "criminal intent does not apply to criminal offenses of that

71. Id. at 67.
72. Id. Professor Sayre asserts that "the movement also synchronized with the
trend of the day away from nineteenth century individualism toward a new sense of the
importance of collective interests. The result was almost inevitable." Id.; see also
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253-54 (1952) (discussing new dangers
flowing out of the Industrial Revolution as "engender[ing] increasingly numerous and
detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular
industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare").
73. Regina v. Stephens, (1866) 1 L.R.Q.B. 702.
74. Sayre, supra note 67, at 59 n.16. Under the law of nuisance, a private nuisance
required proof of special injury different from that which the public suffered. The Court,
understanding this limitation, was simply providing a remedy. "Inasmuch as the object of
this indictment is not to punish the defendant, but really to prevent the nuisance from being
continued, I think that the evidence which would support a civil action would be sufficient to
support an indictment." Id. (quoting Regina, 1 L.R.Q.B. at 704).
75. Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. Dunning, [1909] 2 K.B. 599.
76. Id. at 602.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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particular class which arise only from the breach of a statutory regulation.""
Thus, the categorical distinction between offenses malum in se, which
require proof of mens rea, and offenses malum prohibitum, which do not,
was the rule in the early cases.80
By the middle of the nineteenth century, American courts also began to
recognize this unique breed of regulatory offense, first under regulations
restricting the sale of liquor"' and adulterated milk." Before that time,
however, American courts strictly adhered to the familiar rule which
required proof that the defendant had knowledge of the criminality of his
act.83 By 1876, a year after Regina v. Stephens was decided in England,
Massachusetts courts had "independently evolved the modern conception
of the public welfare offense"" by extending the decisions in the liquor and
adulterated milk cases to other public welfare regulations. For instance, in
Commonwealth v. Raymond," the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held
that one could be convicted under a public health statute for killing a calf
less than four weeks old even without knowledge of its age.86 Said Judge
Foster:

79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299, 304 (1875) ("[T]he rule on the subject
appears to be, that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in those mala prohibita,the only
inquiry is, has the law been violated."). Professor Sayre, however, maintains that the
distinction of whether an offense is "inherently immoral ... is an unsound criterion to
follow." Sayre, supra note 67, at 71. He justifies his position by noting that many types of
crimes universally thought to be immoral ("[t]he keeping of a house of ill-fame or the illegal
sale of narcotics") do not require mens rea while other non-moral offenses ("solicitation of
political contributions by United States officials") do require mens rea. Id.; see also L6vitt,
supra note 34, at 587 (finding "no difference between the two classes of crimes" and noting
that "more persons are killed by automobiles than are murdered each year").
81. Sayre, supra note 67, at 63 (citing Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849) (upholding
conviction for the sale of liquor to a common drunkard, punishable by a fine of ten dollars,
without knowledge that the buyer was a common drunkard)); see also Commonwealth v.
Boynton, 84 Mass. 160 (1861) (upholding conviction for the sale of intoxicating liquor
without knowledge of its intoxicating quality).
82. Sayre, supra note 67, at 65 (citing Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. 489 (1864)
(convicting the defendant for selling adulterated milk although he did not know it to be
adulterated)).
83. Id. at 62 n.27 (citing cases).
84. Id. at 66.
85. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 567 (1867).
86. Sayre, supra note 67, at 65 n.41.
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[T]he defendant is bound to know the facts and obey the law, at
his peril. Such is the general rule where acts which are not mala
in se are made mala prohibita from motives of public policy, and
not because of their moral turpitude or the criminal intent with
which they are committed."
With the public-welfare-offense doctrine firmly planted in both English
and American soil, its application quickly spread to all manner of statutory
offenses, thereby creating a plethora of regulatory and police offenses
punishable without proof of criminal intent." The following discussion will
examine the doctrine as applied in more recent decisions in the United
States.
C. Line Drawingby the High Court
In 1922, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Balint," which held
that criminal intent need not be alleged nor proved to convict for the sale of
a prohibited substance in violation of section 2 of the Anti-Narcotic Act.
The Act imposed heavy penalties-a maximum of five years imprisonment
or $2,000 fine or both.90 In construing the statute, the Court said:
While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every
crime,... there has been a modification of this view in respect to
prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be
obstructed by such a requirement. It is a question of legislative
intent to be construed by the court.91
The Court also quickly dismissed the petitioner's Fourteenth
Amendment due process challenge, citing Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v.
Minnesota92 for the proposition that a state may, in the exercise of its police
power, prohibit and punish conduct as a matter of public policy.93 As Chief

87. Raymond, 97 Mass. at 569.
88. See Sayre, supra note 67, at 84-88 (listing offenses).
89. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
90. Sayre, supra note 67, at 80-81.
91. Balint, 288 U.S. at 251-52.
92. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910) (recognizing
"exceptions" where "the public welfare has made it necessary to declare a crime, irrespective
of the actor's intent").
93. Balint, 288 U.S. at 252.
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Justice Taft observed, "Many instances of this are to be found in regulatory
measures ... where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon
achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the
crimes as in cases of mala in se."" Only one year earlier, however, the Court
in Baender v. Barnett" affirmed a lower court's construction of a statute
prohibiting counterfeiting as requiring both knowledge and a willful act,
despite its silence as to mens rea: "[tihe statute is not intended to include
and make criminal a possession which is not conscious and willing."" Even
though the Baender Court avoided the petitioner's Fifth Amendment due
process challenge, it hinted that an alternate construction might have
worked "manifest injustice or infringe[d] constitutional safeguards.""
Some thirty years later the Court decided Morissette v. United States," a
well-researched opinion authored by Justice Jackson. In Morissette, a
unanimous Court held that criminal intent is an essential element of the
crime of conversion of government property.
Mr. Morissette had gone deer hunting on a tract of rural land where the
government established a practice bombing range. Morissette was convicted
under a federal law that made it a crime to "knowingly" convert
government property. In open daylight, he loaded three tons of spent bomb
casings on his truck and later sold them for $84. He was convicted and
sentenced to either imprisonment for two months or a $200 fine." In his
defense, Morissette thought the casings were abandoned, and he therefore
argued that he lacked the intent to steal the government's property.'00 But
the trial court refused to permit Morissette's counsel to argue to the jury
that Morissette acted innocently; all that needed to be proved, thought the
trial court, was that Morissette took property that did not belong to him,
which he readily admitted.' 0' The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
94. Id.
95. Baenderv. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 225-26 (1921).
96. Id. at 225. In all likelihood, the Court's holding was easily reached by the fact that
the petitioner, who claimed that he had ignorantly acquired certain dies used to counterfeit
coin, pleaded guilty to the indictment. Id.
97. Id. at 225-26.
98. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
99. Id. at 248. The statute carried substantially higher penalties, including fines of not
more than $10,000, ten years imprisonment, or both; but if the value of the converted
property did not exceed the sum of $100, the fine was reduced to not more than $1,000, one
year imprisonment, or both. Id. at 248 n.2.
100. Id. at 247-49.
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Citing Balint and similar precedent,"' the Court of Appeals reasoned
that "the failure of Congress to express such a requisite" was a deliberate
decision by Congress to dispense with the requirement of mens rea.'03 The
Morissette Court, however, did not construe those holdings so expansively.
At the outset of his opinion, Justice Jackson stated, "In those cases this
Court did construe mere omission from a criminal enactment of any
mention of criminal intent as dispensing with it. If they be deemed
precedents for principles of construction generally applicable to federal
penal statutes, they authorize this conviction."'" But then Justice Jackson
backpedaled, recognizing the obvious tension between the powers vested in
Congress and the foundations of criminal justice. "Indeed," he continued,
"such adoption of the literal reasoning announced in those cases would do
this and more-it would sweep out of all federal crimes, except when
expressly preserved, the ancient requirement of a culpable state of mind."'
Siding with the traditions and hard-earned wisdom of Western civilization,
Justice Jackson concluded:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of
the normal individual to choose between good and evil.'06
Although the public-welfare-offense doctrine received deferential approval
in Morissette, the Court was careful to distinguish traditional crime and
preserve its fundamental character.' Moreover, Morissette rejected the
rationale in Balint and other cases that inferred a congressional intent to
dispense with mens rea where a penal statute is silent as to mental elements
on the theory that proof of criminal intent would obstruct the statute's
purpose. If that were true, the Court reasoned, "[tihe purpose of every

102. The Court of Appeals also relied on United States v. Behrnan, 258 U.S. 280 (1922),
decided on the same day as United States v. Balint, 288 U.S. 250 (1922), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that an indictment under the Anti-Narcotic Act "need not
charge such knowledge or intent." Behrman, 258 U.S. at 288.
103. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 252-56.
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statute would be 'obstructed' by requiring a finding of intent."'08 Instead,
the Court adopted a different rule of interpretation, one which presumes
that Congress did not intend to dispense with mens rea, at least for
traditional categories of crime:
Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely
adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so
well defined in common law and statutory interpretation by the
states may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same
silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose
definition the courts have no guidance except the Act."o9
Thus, there emerged the rule of statutory interpretation still in use today;
and like most good rules, its vigor comes from its stability, recognizing that
long-standing traditions not only color the conscience of a civilization, but
also preserve the meaning of language." 0 "[W]here Congress borrows terms
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries
of practice," writes Justice Jackson, "it presumably knows and adopts the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."'"
108. Id. at 259.
109. Id. at 262. It is noteworthy that Justice Jackson's presumption in favor of requiring
mens rea divides along common-law crimes and those "new to general law," which is yet
another way of distinguishing between mala in se and mala prohibita.A nearly identical rule
was laid down over seven decades earlier in the case of Regina v. Prince, (1875) 2 L.R.C.C.R.
154, in which the Court for Crown Cases Reserved declared that "where a statute creates a
crime, the intention of the legislature should be presumed to be to include 'knowingly' in the
definition of the crime, and the statute should be read as if that word were inserted, unless
the contrary intention appears." Id. at 171.
110. God, too, commands a continuity of relations with those who love him. So much is
implied when He asks of Israel, "What iniquity have your fathers found in me, that they are
gone far from me, and have walked after vanity, and are become vain?" Jeremiah 2:5 (King
James). The modern conception of liberty blissfully discards every signature of tradition. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.").
111. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. "In such case," says Justice Jackson, "absence of contrary
direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure
from them." Id. Justice Jackson's common-sense approach is not new. Indeed, a similar rule
was promulgated in the first century by St. Paul for the preservation of the Christian faith.
See 2 Thessalonians 2:15 ("So then, brothers, stand firm and hold to the traditionsthat you
were taught by us, either by our spoken word or by our letter.") (emphasis added); 2
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Shortly after Morissette was decided, a Fourteenth Amendment due
process challenge came before the Court in Lambert v. California."2 In
Lambert, a Los Angeles municipal ordinance required convicted felons to
register with the Chief of Police if they remained in Los Angeles for a period
of more than five days. Failure to do so was punishable as a felony, and each
day's failure constituted a separate offense.'13 Ms. Lambert was charged with
violating the registration law (she was previously convicted for forgery, a
felony in California). At her trial, Lambert's due process objections had
gone unheeded. Her case was tried to a jury and she was found guilty, fined
$250, and placed on probation for three years. The Appellate Department of
the Superior Court affirmed the judgment." 4
The Lambert Court first noted that the language of the ordinance
contained "no element of willfulness";" 5 and the lower courts did not
construe the ordinance as requiring one. Therefore, the ordinance was
construed as imposing absolute liability. The Court noted further that
Lambert had no actual knowledge of her duty to register. From these two
facts the Court framed the question: "[W]hether a registration act of this
character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no
actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of
the probability of such knowledge.""' The Court answered in the
affirmative and reversed, although it struggled to justify its conclusion.
First, the Court declared that "[elngrained in our concept of due process is
the requirement of notice.""' According to the Court, however, notice is
only "sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend
charges.""' Unable to reconcile the requirement of notice with notions of
absolute liability," 9 the Court nevertheless held that the lack of notice was

Thessalonians 3:6 ("Now we command you, brothers, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ,
that you keep away from any brother who is walking in idleness and not in accord with the
tradition that you received from us.") (emphasis added); 1 Corinthians 11:2 ("Now I
commend you because you remember me in everything and maintain the traditions even as I
delivered them to you.") (emphasis added).
112. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 226.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 228 (stating that "ignorance of the law will not excuse").
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inconsistent with the demands of due process.120 In so holding, the Court
focused on the character of the offense (i.e., a crime of omission) and the
fact that Ms. Lambert lacked actual or probable knowledge.121
III. PROBLEM
This Comment attempts to answer the following question: When may
the state dispense with the ingredient of intent-mens rea-from statutory
offenses enacted pursuant to the police power?
The Supreme Court "has never articulated a general constitutional
doctrine of mens rea."' 22 Therefore, the concept of crime has traditionally
been left to the states.123 But that needs to change if America is to maintain
120. Id. at 229-30. "We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of
the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a
conviction under the ordinance can stand." Id. at 229.
121. It seems the Court found sufficiently persuasive the distinction between crimes of
omission and crimes of commission to justify its holding: "It is unlike the commission of
acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences
of his deed." Id. at 228. The Court also denounced the rule laid down by Blackstone, supra
note 23, because, as the Court observed, "conduct alone without regard to the intent of the
doer is often sufficient." Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228.
122. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968).
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and
duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment
of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This
process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States.
Id. at 536.
123. Id. Unless, of course, if the definition of crime happens to invade one's right to
privacy or, far worse, furthers a belief that certain conduct is immoral. See, e.g., Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas penal law prohibiting homosexual
sodomy "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice ... ."). If we are to accept this dangerous trend in legal reasoning (i.e., the divorce of
law from morality), the entire concept of crime and therefore criminal law as an institution
must be abandoned. As Justice Scalia observed, "This effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Practically speaking, however, such a reality is a long way off, if not utterly
impossible, for it is unlikely the Court's conclusions will gain momentum in the long run.
The common sense of people and the spirit of our Western civilization militate against it.
Crime is fundamentally about good and evil, the enduring trademarks of morality. See
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the moral allegiance of its people. Because regulation is a more expedient
device for the attainment of political objectives than individualized
prosecution under the criminal law, societies must be guarded against the
kind of misguided reliance on regulation that ends ultimately in alienating
our Creator. Otherwise, what is to prevent the gradual, but inevitable
tyranny of little laws which suffocates the creative energy of a culture? 4
And what is to prevent the consequent decay in morals, as individuals
gradually cease to be profited by what the Schoolmen called "the discipline
of [the] laws"?"'
The question presently under consideration is especially significant
today, as American life continues to adapt to the demands (and worries) of
an increasingly complex civilization. Left unguarded, the reaction to
regulate in lieu of punishment will likely become the source of an all-toocommon injustice, namely, the sacrifice of human dignity in the name of
utility. Moreover, the corrosion of criminal law, and our abandonment of
the principles that animate it, will perpetuate this unhealthy affair through
the mood and conduit of the people, whose reverence for the rule of law will
surely diminish under a dominion of pure utility. No longer will the law
serve to punish wrongdoing and therefore promote virtuous living; law will
ON CRIME 41 (2008) ("Criminal laws are value-driven
judgments about good and evil."). As one ancient source of our legal tradition bears witness,
"secular justice and compulsion are necessary in the case of... secular ordinances, because
many people cannot otherwise be recalled from their evil-doing and many are unwilling to
dispose themselves to the worship of God and the practice of lawful behaviour." LEGES
HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 24, c. 11, 16; accord 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.95, art.
1, ad. 1 ("Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better
than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are
compelled."); Romans 13:3-4 (Douay-Rheims Version) ("For princes are not a terror to the
good work, but to the evil.... For he is God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon
him that doth evil.").
124. A notable account of the opposite extreme can be found in St. Thomas More's
mythical commonwealth. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (George M. Logan et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1995) (c. 1516). As retold by More, Raphael Hythloday tells of his experience
with the Utopians:
They have very few laws, for their training is such that very few suffice. The
chief fault they find with other nations is that even their infinite volumes of
laws and interpretations are not adequate. They think it completely unjust to
bind people by a set of laws that are too many to be read or too obscure for
anyone to understand. As for lawyers, a class of men whose trade it is to
manipulate cases and multiply quibbles, they exclude them entirely.
Id. at 195.
125. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.95, art. 1, respondeo.
CHARLES P. NEMETH, AQUINAS
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merely make of citizens a fuel for the great machine of which they are a
part.
Yet there is an even greater danger than all of this, one which by its very
nature results in retrogression-moral, intellectual, political-until at last
we arrive at a kind of spiritual starvation. God asked of the prophet
Jeremiah, "What iniquity have your fathers found in me, that they are gone
far from me, and have walked after vanity, and are become vain?" 26 Thus,
the danger our civilization faces, one which crept in through the rise of
modernism in the sixteenth century, is the sin of idolatry: the worship of
man in place of God. Therefore, with all due respect for the
commandment' 27 and the dangers to which it speaks, we turn now to
analyze the limits of state power with respect to crime and punishment.
IV. PROPOSAL

It has been said that "[o]ne half the doubts in life arise from the defects of
language";128 the other half results from a lack of faith in it. Although
language alone is never self-defining, we must trust in it because it is the
only art form we have to express complex ideas. And whether the goal is to
convey a simple fact or an inscrutable mystery, the language of our criminal
law is patterned after the moral dogmas which are its makeup. Thus, for
example, "the law is administered upon the principle that everyone must be
taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it." 29 But
this principle is at once problematic, for if that is true, why did the Court in
Morissette not uphold the conviction? If we presume that Mr. Morissette in
fact knew that taking the discarded bomb casings constituted a federal
crime (which he was bound to obey), how, then, could the Court conclude
126. Jeremiah2:5 (King James).
127. See Exodus 20:3-6 (King James):
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any
thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the
water under the earth.
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LoRD
thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children
unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me;
And shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my
commandments.
Id.
128. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 232 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
129. M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 723; 10 Cl. & F. 200,210.
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that he had not transgressed the law when he freely and consciously
gathered three tons worth? Or was the trial court correct when it instructed
the jury?o13 The answer is discoverable with little effort. Rightly understood,
the rule that ignorance of the law will not excuse is no mere tool of
utilitarian justice; it is a metaphysical reality.
If one finds solace in the story of origins, and the belief that even the
English common law is the flowering of pagan customs, Sir Frederick
Pollock's discussion of the "less corrupted tradition of natural law""'3
among the heathen Germans may provide a safe harbor to explore the
precept above. "[Iun claiming justice for our pagan ancestors," Pollock
writes, "I have no desire to be less than just to the Church." The rest of his
words bear repeating in full:
All the Germanic virtues,"' in so far as they agree with the
precepts and commendations of the Church, belong to the law of
nature in the regular scholastic usage of the term: that is to say,
they are the following of general rules binding on all men as
moral and rational beings, and discoverable by human reason
without any special aid of revelation."' According to the

130. The trial court instructed the jury:
[I]f this young man took this property (and he says he did), without any
permission (he says he did), that was on the property of the United States
Government (he says it was), that it was of the value of one cent or more (and
evidently it was), that he is guilty of the offense charged here.... The question
of intent is whether or not he intended to take the property.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 249 (1952).
131. POLLOCK,supra note 26, at 11.
132. Of the virtues the German people naturally possessed before their conversion by the
Roman evangelists, Pollock recites (on authority of Tacitus) respect for women and
monogamy in marriage; courage and valor; and a great public life grounded in the will of the
people, save on occasion of war, with decision-making authority vested in free men
assembled in arms. Id. at 8-9. Nevertheless, Pollock admits that "it would be foolish to claim
for the Teutonic nations or kindred an exclusive title to any one of the qualities noted by
Tacitus." Id. at 10. In this respect, Belloc would have concurred. See BELLOC, supra note 2, at
95 (stating that "a little knowledge of Europe will teach us that there was nothing novel or
peculiar in such customs"). "[A]s the Dark Ages approach and advance," Belloc writes, there
was everywhere "the meetings of armed men in council, the chieftain assisted in his
government by such meetings, the weaponed assent or dissent of the great men in
conference, the division of land and people into 'hundreds,' the fine for murder, and all the
rest of it." Id.
133. In his epistle to the church at Rome, St. Paul teaches that the Ten Commandments
are universally binding on all men:
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accepted teaching of the Schoolmen,"'3 if I am rightly informed,
there is no sufficient cause, indeed no excuse, for man even in his
fallen state not to know the law of nature; his defect is not in
understanding but in will, and his works are unacceptable for
want of obedience rather than of knowledge.135
Thus, even Pollock's patriotism bows to that legal order fully fashioned in
the Middle Ages, of which the moderns know very little today. Strictly
speaking, therefore, the maxim ignorantia juris neminem excusat only

For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law
requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law.
They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their
conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even
excuse them on that day when according to my gospel, God judges the secrets
of men by Christ Jesus.
Romans 2:14-16.
134. See, e.g., 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.90, art. 4, ad. 1 ("The natural law is
promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him
naturally.").
135. POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 11. Blackstone would have concurred:
[I]gnorance or mistake is another defect of will: when a man, intending to do a
lawful act, does that which is unlawful. For here the deed and the will acting
separately, there is not that conjunction between them, which is necessary to
form a criminal act. But this must be an ignorance or mistake of fact, and not
an error in point of law.... For a mistake in point of law, which every person of
discretion not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal
cases no sort of defence.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *27. Blackstone is here describing the Aristotelian principle
that only ignorance with respect to "particulars," and not "universals," renders an act
involuntary. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, at 50-51 (David Ross trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (c. 384 B.C.) ("For it is on these [particulars] that both pity and
pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily."); cf 2
AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.6, art. 8, respondeo ("If ignorance cause
involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition
of voluntariness ... ."). The principle that only a voluntary act is a moral one was later
reconciled with the Catholic doctrine of actual sin (i.e., mortal sin), of which St. Augustine
was the first to propose a definition. See id. Q.71, art. 6.
The latter half of Pollock's discussion, in which he speaks of understanding and will,
is likewise in accord with the teaching of St. Thomas, who, in answering the question
whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will, says "the will moves all the other
powers of the soul to the end .... Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking,
is an act of the will." Id. Q.12, art. 1,respondeo.

424

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:397

applies to that body of unwritten law known as the natural law;' 36
consequently, its operation is not easily extended to positive law, which
requires promulgation, without the aid of a legal fiction (i.e., constructive
knowledge).
Nevertheless, the principle has transgressed its proper
boundaries on account of widespread confusion concerning the nature of
law itself, with the result that many who investigate the subject cannot
reconcile the doctrine with notions of fairness and morality. 3 8 We will
return to this doctrine shortly.139
A note of caution is needed before proceeding. This Comment does not
propose to answer the question of whether American courts have authority
to interpret and apply natural law, and to what extent they may do so
(although the application of reason to concrete facts is in some circles
considered to be natural-law jurisprudence). Nevertheless, a measure of
sympathy is in order for those who have addressed the question with
caution and a healthy dose of skepticism;o they know better than to play

136. The content of the natural law, its interpretation, and other distinctions among
theologians and natural-law scholars is not the subject of this paper. For the purpose of this
Comment, however, the Thomistic definition has been adopted: "the natural law is nothing
else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law." Id. Q.91, art. 2, respondeo;
see also Sean N. Cunningham, In Defense of Law: The Common-Sense Jurisprudence of
Aquinas, 1 LIBERTY U. L. REv. 73 (2006); NEMETH, supra note 123. Despite the differences that
divide, certainly most, if not all, proponents of natural-law jurisprudence would readily
admit that traditional, common law crimes, such as homicide and larceny, are undoubtedly
immoral acts naturally known by every man. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 476
(2001) (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("At the time of the framing, common-law crimes were
considered unobjectionable, for a law founded on the law of nature may be retrospective,
because it always existed ... .") (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. See HALL, supra note 10, at 376. There is a half-truth in the fact that public
condemnation and punishment of "certain highly immoral acts" provide a minimal certainty
and knowledge of the criminal law. Id. at 381. But as Professor Hall maintains, the "deterrent
theory... hardly comes into contact with the actual springs of moral conduct and
conformity with penal law." Id.
138. See, e.g., Dennis Jenkins, Comment, Criminal Prosecution and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act: An Analysis of the Constitution and Criminal Intent in an Environmental
Context, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 595, 597 (1997) ("Although the criminal law.. . sought
to punish only the morally blameworthy, the law, in a confusing and ill-defined paradox, also
generally held that ignorance of the law was no excuse from criminal liability.").
139. See infra Part IV.B.
140. In Griswold v. Connecticut, for example, Justice Black said,
If these formulas based on 'natural justice,' . . . are to prevail, they require
judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own
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with fire, even when they have no faith in its existence. But there is a
difference between admiring the architecture of a building and becoming an
architect. This Comment merely advocates for renovation, not innovation.
A. Moral Good and Evil Are Firstin the Will.
The power of the state to punish its citizens turns on the fundamental
nature of crime. As C. S. Lewis observed, it would indeed be a wicked thing
to punish a man in order to make an example of him, unless, of course, he
deserved it."' "[Tlhe concept of Desert is the only connecting link between
punishment and Justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence
can be just or unjust." 42 As St. Thomas observes, "Punishment is due to sin.
But every sin is voluntary according to Augustine. Therefore vengeance
should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily."'43 Herein
lies the animating precept of all lawful retribution: that is, desert is
reconciled to justice when it flows from conduct for which a man is subject
to moral guilt.'" Such is, as Holmes calls it, the "mystic bond between
wrong and punishment."' Though hardly a novel ethic, it bears repeating
in today's modern world.
This precept, however, is buttressed by yet another of capital
importance-the arrival of evil in its first cause. Moral guilt stems from an
interior principle, the movement of the will, within the human actor that is
voluntary: this principle the law calls mens rea. And on this final point there
is no shortage of authority to counteract the small, but potent train of
abuses'" against our dogma. "The saying that 'no one is voluntarily wicked
nor involuntarily happy' seems to be partly false and partly true; for no one
is involuntarily happy," writes Aristotle, "but wickedness is voluntary."'
Indeed, as Jesus declares, "For from within, out of the heart of man, come
evil thoughts....""' St. Thomas thus affirms that "moral good and evil are
appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to make such
decisions is of course that of a legislative body.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
141. Lewis, supra note 52, at 225.
142. Id.

143.
144.
145.
146.

3 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. II pt. II. Q.108, art. 4, sed contra.
"[H]e shall reward every man according to his works." Matthew 16:27 (King James).
HOLMES, supranote 52, at 37; see also supra note 60.
See, e.g., HALL, supra note 10, at 333.

147. ARISTOTLE, supra note 135, at 59.

148. Mark 7:21.
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first in the will.""' Likewise, Sir Matthew Hale states that "[tihe consent of
the will is that, which renders human actions either commendable or
culpable; ... where there is no will to commit an offense, there can be no
transgression, or just reason to incur the penalty."'s Blackstone, too,
teaches the same: "An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither
can it induce any guilt: the concurrence of the will ... being the only thing
that renders human action either praiseworthy or culpable."' 5 ' Thus, the
lesson to be learned from these learned men, indeed Christ himself, is that
human actions-our works-have real moral consequences because of an
invisible act of the will, in which it freely assents to the object of its
choosing. To hold otherwise is error, and to persist therein is heresy.
It is necessary at this juncture to briefly expand on the concept of
voluntariness, for the term "voluntary" is sometimes analyzed under the
doctrine of actus reus, or the criminal act.'52 The usual reason for doing so is
to distinguish generally volitional acts from reflexive or otherwise
unconscious conduct.' But the concept of voluntariness cannot be rightly
understood apart from mens rea.
The concept of actus reus may be defined in one of two ways. First, actus
reus signifies the external circumstances that are proscribed by penal law,
apart from proof of the mental element.' This first definition has nothing
to do with the doctrine of voluntariness; it precedes it. Second, actus reus
signifies the external manifestation of mens rea, and it is in this sense that
one may correctly speak of voluntary acts. After all, mens rea-which is the
essence of crime-is itself a voluntary act, albeit an internal act. Professor
Hall thus rightly concludes that "actus reus implies mens rea."'" Yet to
analyze whether an act is voluntary under the rubric of actus reus is to cause
unnecessary confusion. Therefore, this Comment conceives of actus reus in
its true, orthodox sense, as the external manifestation of mens rea, which is
149. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I pt. II. Q.20, art. 1, sed contra.
150. 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14-15 (1736).
151. BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *20-21.
152. See, e.g., People v. Newton, 340 N.Y.S. 2d 77, 80 (1973) ("The doing of an act may by
statute be made criminal without regard to the doer's intent or knowledge, but an
involuntary action is not criminal."). And the casebooks, likewise, ordinarily discuss
voluntariness under the heading of actus reus. E.g., JOSEPH G. COOK ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW iX
(6th ed. 2008); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW xxiii (5th ed.

2009); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW xvii (4th ed. 2003).
153. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962).
154. See HALL, supra note 10, at 224 (discussing Dr. Glanville Williams's definition).
155. Id. at 230.
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an interior act of the will, freely made."' This seems to be the position taken
by Professor Hall: "What is required to incur penal liability is that the mens
rea be thus manifested in criminal conduct."' "The internal mens rea," he
says, "held in check, is by that extra effort externalized.... The additional
effort may be viewed as the projection forward into conduct of the already
existent action-thought of mens rea.""' St. Thomas describes "the act of the
will [as] the form . .. of the external action,"'59 and states further that "the
interior act of the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one

act." 60
With these principles properly before us, it is now necessary to state
precisely what mens rea is. As implied above, and so far as criminal law is
concerned, mens rea is principally about freewill. Simply stated, mens rea
means a willful transgression of law. Indeed, there was never a more perfect
adjective to define a culpable mental state than the word "willful."
Therefore, a crime is simply a willful transgression of a criminal law: that is,
where the object of the will has been criminalized by the legislative power of
the state. This definition is the constitutional minimum.
Note, however, that this definition presupposes the existence of other
human powers besides that of the will, namely intellect, which implies
knowledge and the use of reason.' 6 ' Thus, the total doctrine of mens rea is a

156. If one wishes to reconcile the ordinary usage of those terms (mens rea and actus reus
as in the first definition), then a voluntary act is the concurrence of both mens rea and actus
reus-the interior act of the will and the external circumstances that are proscribed by law.
The critical point to be seized is that no act is voluntary unless all of the conditions of mens
rea are satisfied.
157. HALL, supra note 10, at 180.
158. Id. at 179-80.

159. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.20, art. 3, sed contra.
160. Id. respondeo. St. Thomas distinguishes the "goodness or malice" of the external
action by either "its relation to the end" or "in regard to its matter and circumstances." Id.
For the former, he holds that the internal act and the external action are morally one,
"through the medium of the act of the will." Id. For the latter, however, he holds that the
goodness or malice of the will and the external action are distinct in the physical order, id.,
and yet "combine to form one thing in the moral order." Id. ad. 1.
161. See HALE, supra note 150, at 15 ("[T]he liberty or choice of the will presupposeth an
act of the understanding to know the thing or action chosen by the will...."); see also 2
AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.6, art. 1, sed contra. It is for this reason that criminal
laws, indeed all human laws, require promulgation, see id. Q.90, art. 4, so that a person is
given the opportunity to inform one's conscience of the requirements of law and, therefore,
conform his conduct in accordance therewith. Cf U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1
(prohibiting ex post facto laws).
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clustered concept. For this reason, a distortion as to one of its parts renders
the whole unbalanced. A fair definition of mens rea is given by Professor
Hall:
mens rea includes relevant cognition, i.e. knowledge of the
material facts, and an internal effort, 'movement of the will;' and
the additionally required manifested effort ('act') must be
established by relevant evidence, different from and beyond that
which establishes the mens rea. This evidence consists of the
occurrence of a legally proscribed harm under conditions which
make it imputable to the offender.1 62
Accordingly, mens rea may be understood as the gateway to a host of other
doctrines our criminal law has traditionally entertained in its inquiry into
the culpability of the accused. Thus, for example, a mistake of fact as to
circumstances deprives a person of knowledge, thereby rendering the
person's act involuntary and therefore excused.6 3 In like manner, a defect in
reason (the traditional insanity defense) exculpates the commission of an
unlawful act. Man is capable of crime because he is a rational being.
Consequently, a man without the use of reason is something less than a
man; he is more like an irrational animal, incapable of crime.'" The
celebrated rule in M'Naghten's Case is a good example. 6 ' Finally, there are
those special doctrines which examine the will itself, to determine whether
it was overcome by coercion or other kinds of violence,'66 such as the "heat

162. HALL, supra note 10, at 183-84.
163. See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I pt. II. Q.6, art. 8, respondeo.

164. See HALL, supra note 10, at 475 (criticizing modern psychology for distorting the
doctrines of early writers (e.g., Bracton) and noting "the ancient doctrine that man is
distinguishable from other animals by his reason").
165. M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719; 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210.
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as not to know that what he was
doing was wrong.
Id.
166. The internal act of the will is immune from all kinds of violence and coercion. 2

AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.6, art. 4, respondeo. Indeed, as God would have it, the
human will is truly free. The one exception, however, is God himself, who "can move the will
of man, according to Proverbs 21:1: 'The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord;
withersoever He will He shall turn it.'" Id. Q.6, art. 4, ad. 1.
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of passion" defense in cases of homicide.' 7 This gateway rationale seems to
be the understanding of Blackstone, who states, "All the several pleas and
excuses which protect the committer of a forbidden act from the
punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced to this
single consideration, the want or defect of will."'"
From the foregoing discussion a startling principle emerges: mens rea is
the metaphysical key that grants mankind entry to the Almighty's judgment
seat.' A truly culpable mind is a guilty mind, the assurance of which is
declared by the doctrine of mens rea, without which freedom would be
meaningless. Therefore, as both a moral and legal reality, it is high time the
Supreme Court incorporated the requirement of mens rea with respect to
traditional crimeO into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Substantive due process has become the guardian of fundamental rights,
which, as Justice Scalia says, "prohibits States from infringing fundamental
liberty interests, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.""' Those rights which are deemed fundamental
and therefore worthy of constitutional protection are "'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.""7 2 This objective standard is eminently
reasonable, for what else is substantive due process if not a defense of the
continuity of tradition, and of that great mass of morals which comprise the
167. See, e.g., Hannah v. Commonwealth, 149 S.E. 419, 421 (Va. 1929) ("'Malice
aforethought' implies a mind under the sway of reason, whereas 'passion' whilst it does not
imply a dethronement of reason, yet it is the furor brevis, which renders a man deaf to the
voice of reason .... ").
168. BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *20. It seems in this regard, however, Blackstone
could have been more precise in his explanation, as he fails to consider the powers of reason
and the intellect as other potential sources of exculpation, unless if by the word "will" he
means the clustered concept of mens rea. Cf 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II, Q.20, art.
2, respondeo (stating that there is a "twofold goodness or malice" with respect to external
actions involving both reason and will); id. Q.19, art. 5, respondeo ("[Elvery will at variance
with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.").
169. Leviticus 19:15 ("You shall do no injustice in court. You shall not be partial to the
poor or defer to the great, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor."); see also John
5:27 ("And he has given him [Christ] authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of
Man.").
170. That is, all crimes known to the common law, whether or not codified by statute.
The state's power to call into existence new crimes unknown to the common law is discussed
infra Part IV.B.
171. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).

430

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:397

heart and soul of Western civilization? Thus, with respect to traditional
crime, the Court should incorporate the "ancient requirement of a culpable
state of mind"173 into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For it may truly be said that "neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [it was] sacrificed." 7 1
The Supreme Court's current law on presumptions in criminal cases
lends strong support to this conclusion.7 And the foregoing authorities
provide ample evidence of a largely unbroken tradition of a conception of
crime within the Western legal tradition that mandates moral guilt as a
requisite to punishment. To break from that tradition would be a
considerable step back to the ancient institutions our civilization outgrew
when the West was Pagan. Therefore, the need for constitutional safeguards
becomes obvious when mens rea is considered in its whole historical
context: man (and thus the state) is powerless to alter or abolish the
fundamental nature of crime.
This conclusion, however, does not provide any guidance with respect to
the state's power to fashion statutory offenses, the subject of which are
unknown to the common law, and dispense with mens rea altogether.'76
How does the Federal Constitution cabin the power of the public-welfareoffense doctrine? To this question we now turn our attention.

173. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
174. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (alteration in original),
overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
175. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (holding that due process
disallows either conclusive or burden-shifting presumptions on the element of felonious
intent); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process "protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged"). While these decisions evidence
the Court's assumption that mens rea is an element of crime worthy of constitutional
protection, they do not address the ultimate question of whether a legislature may dispense
with mens rea in a public welfare offense.
176. See United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir. 1943) ("The
constitutional requirement of due process is not violated merely because mens rea is not a
required element of a prescribed crime.").
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B. Alien Ethics
1. Natural Law Crimes
The United States recognizes no binding moral authority beyond its own
political makeup."' Hence, all is a matter of private judgment, and law is,
practically speaking, the will of a governing majority in accordance with its
constitution. Yet, as Justice Jackson once said, "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."7 8 While at first blush this seems a proper piece of American
dogma, Justice Jackson's assertion presents an obstacle when it comes to
crime, since proof of culpability, which is a requisite of just punishment, is
essentially a moraljudgment. But whose? Despite the extreme opinions held
by many modern ethicists, most people agree that some moral values are
naturally fixed,"' which the law has long called mala in se; but what about
offenses that are not inherently evil? Is conduct criminal simply because a
majority of people say so, or is there another principle at work?
Returning to the doctrine ignorantia juris neminem excusat, it was
explained above that a mistake of law will not excuse a common law crime
because the conduct is inherently evil; thus, the object of the will, and
therefore the will itself, is criminally culpable even if no positive law is in
place which forbids the conduct. A presumption of actual knowledge that
certain conduct is criminal arises from man's natural constitution. As St.
Thomas explains, "The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God
instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally." 80
Therefore, as Justice Scalia observes, "[A] law founded on the law of nature
may be retrospective, because it always existed.""' Consequently, natural
law crimes, even if not proscribed by positive law, can, in a manner of
speaking, be thought of as conduct for which a person is absolutely liable,
because the prosecution need not prove whether the accused had knowledge
177. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
178. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). "If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception," Justice Jackson continues, "they do not now
occur to us." Id. This Comment argues for an implicit exception in the case of criminal laws.
See infra Part IV.B. Furthermore, mens rea is indeed an act.
179. 3 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. II. pt. II. Q.47, art. 6, respondeo (stating that "the ends
of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason").
180. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.90, art. 4, ad. 1.
181. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 476 (2001) (Scalia, J.dissenting).
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that his conduct was forbidden by positive law, but only whether the
accused manifested the requisite mens rea: that is, whether the accused
acted willfully in bringing about an intended result forbidden by natural
law. 182
Taken in this sense, however, the law's application is not technically that
of absolute liability as that term is typically used, but rather serves to show
the place of positive law in the equation of culpability. Merely writing down
a description of what mankind has long considered evil adds nothing to the
moral gravity of the offense, except, perhaps, to make the punishment
known. Thus, with respect to natural law crimes, the state does not legislate
in fact; it is merely called upon to act, in accordance with its power and
authority, by exercising retributive justice on behalf of the victim. And
recall, further, that it is the nature of crime-mens rea-which invokes the
power (and duty) of the state to punish the criminal, in recognition of
preexisting moral values. In sum, with respect to common law crimes, God,
and not the state, is acting as the moral authority, and the power thus
exercised by the state is simply punitive.
2. Mens Rea and Statutory Crimes
A difficulty arises, however, when the state calls into existence new
crimes, not a few of which are foreign to the common law. Of such
legislation there are two kinds: those that require proof of mens rea and
those that do not. Typically, the former are considered to be crimes in the
orthodox sense, especially where the object of the law's prohibition is
derived from one common law crime or another.'" The latter, on the other
hand, are defined as public welfare offenses, prohibitions for which an
offender is strictly liable. Yet the distinction between the two cannot turn
simply on the presence or absence of mens rea within the definition of the
offense; that would be a distinction without meaning. Surprisingly, the
Supreme Court has offered little guidance on the subject, save its holding in
Lambert' with respect to criminal omissions. Likewise, a rather malleable
rule of due process has split the federal circuits.'
182. This analysis would still allow for defenses of excuse and justification, as where the
accused acted involuntarily on account of a mistake of fact.
183. In such cases there is fundamentally no difference between a common law and
statutory crime, for the state is merely affecting the subject on which the prohibition operates
(e.g., bankers).
184. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
185. Compare United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1124 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
felony provision in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act imposing two years in jail, $2,000 fine, or
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When public welfare offenses were coming into prominence, courts
usually called them police regulations, denominated as such under the
theory that they derived their efficacy by reason of the police power-that
is, the state's broad authority to enact laws for the benefit of the health,
morals, and general welfare of its citizens. The state "has an undoubted
right," says Blackstone, "for the well-being and peace of the community, to
make some things unlawful, which are in themselves indifferent."'8 6
Consequently, police regulations punishable regardless of criminal intent
were labeled malum prohibitum in order to distinguish them from crimes
malum in se.'" While this distinction has not found favor among some of
the commentators,'" it is nevertheless fundamentally correct, and thus
quite useful, as it relates to the object sought to be proscribed. In light of the
foregoing principles, however, a more holistic view of the distinction
between policy and punishment is that of a twin effort by man and state,
which, as will be shown by the principle below, depends on three elements:
(1) the particular power being exercised by the state; (2) the natural moral
gravity of the conduct proscribed by law; and (3) mens rea.
3. The Invalidating Principle
As discussed above, the state's authority to impose a lawful punishment
is premised on culpability-that is, a finding that the accused committed
the crime with the requisite mens rea. In such cases the state exercises a
punitive power, essentially an act of public vengeance,'"9 apart from the
broad police powers it enjoys as sovereign. Once again, the reason for the
rule is this: mens rea is the causal link which invokes the state's authority to
exercise retributivejustice on behalf of the victim. Inversely, where the state
both, violated substantive due process, while validating the penalties under the misdemeanor
provision imposing a fine of $500 and six months in jail), with United States v. Engler, 806
F.2d 425, 434 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding the Act and stating that "[tihe differences between
the objective penalties of the misdemeanor and felony provisions [are] for due process
purposes, de minimis").
186. BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *42.
187. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 10, at 341 (stating that "the judicial reliance upon mala in
se-mala prohibita in support of strict penal liability is fallacious" and "the theory upon
which it rests is highly questionable") (citations omitted); Sayre, supra note 67, at 70-71
(calling the distinction "an unsound criterion to follow"); Ivitt, supra note 34, at 587-88
("There is no difference between them which is an inherent difference.").
189. Romans 13:3-4 (Douay-Rheims Version) ("For princes are not a terror to the good
work, but to the evil.... For he is God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that
doth evil.").
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exercises a regulatory power for the common good of its citizens,
enforcement by way of absolute liability is lawful under limited
circumstances. Accordingly, the power of the state to enact public welfare
offenses for which offenders are liable, irrespective of criminal intent, first
depends on the mode of its agency, which in turn depends on the particular
power it is exercising-either punitive or regulatory, the first being invoked
by the individual, the second by the legislator pursuant to the police power.
Nevertheless, where the state prohibits certain conduct and imposes the
sanction of absolute liability, it runs the risk of exceeding its authority by
usurping a power that belongs exclusively to God. As explained above, for
common law crimes, actual knowledge of the crime itself (whether codified
or not) is presumed because the conduct is inherently evil, and the work of
the prosecutor is thus concerned only with proving a willful transgression.
But the presumption naturally fails where the state assigns a new moral
value to conduct that was previously morally indifferent. And where the
nature of the offense is "criminal," having crossed the threshold from police
to punitive powers, the sanction of absolute liability under these conditions
amounts to an attempt by the state to exercise a moral power over a man's
conscience. This the state is powerless to accomplish, and the law is a
nullity, for the state thereby acts under color of office, by placing itself in the
position of God, who alone has power to promulgate the unwritten moral
precepts of the natural law into the minds of men. 9 o
Fundamentally, this invalidating principle finds its source in the First
Amendment"' to the United States Constitution, which denies to Congress
and the several states the authority to establish an official orthodoxy.'92 "The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights [is] to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy," said Justice Jackson in Barnette, "to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."' Thus, when a
political majority declares "certain subjects" that were previously amoral to
190. See Jeremiah31:33; Romans 2:12-16.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion...."). Certainly a man's opinion as to what is and is not moral is a religious belief;
thus, a majority of men promulgating their religious beliefs as criminal laws are exercising a
form of religious coercion on the people. "The coercion that was a hallmark of historical
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by
force of law and threat of penalty." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
192. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
193. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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be morally grave offenses, thus binding the conscience, the invocation of so
great a power is justified only if actual knowledge of the illegality of the act
(i.e., the actus reus) is proved. For only under these conditions is the state
authorized to punish transgressors, the reason being that disobedience
subjects the offender to authentic moral guilt."' Consequently, the offender
in such cases must have acted with the requisite mens rea as defined by
statute; and if the statute is silent, a willful transgression-the constitutional
minimum'"'-must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The awful, but necessary business of crafting criminal laws must include
humanity in the equation, recognizing the dignity of each individual by
allowing freedom to take its course. As Justice Jackson said, "Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 9 6 The
magic of mens rea is in bridging the gap between the individual and the
state. Majorities may indeed outlaw what is deemed to be offensive to the
common good of the state; but the predicate to punishment is in the hands
of the smallest of minorities-the individual, who must initiate his own
criminal trial by the misuse of his liberty. To punish an individual under
any other conditions is to pretend the state has power to promulgate its
moral views "into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally."m
4. Punitive vs. Police Powers
The next and difficult question that arises is, how can courts discern the
often dim line between the state's punitive and regulatory powers? The
principle is easily explained but not susceptible to any bright-line rule
because the moral inquiry is fact sensitive, one which wavers between the
extremes of good and evil; and the line connecting the two is bifurcated by a
species of conduct that may be classified as morally indifferent. Thus, on the
one extreme, any statutory prohibition that renders a person subject to
moral guilt, and therefore punishment, is punitive in nature. Here, the law
prohibits something inherently immoral, and the state's focus is therefore
on the individual and only incidentally on the common good. Legislation of
this type demands of citizens their moral allegiance; and the discipline of
obedience therewith perfects the people in accordance with the virtues of
the state.
194. Romans 13:2 ("Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has
appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment.").
195. See supra Part IV.A.
196. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
197. See supra note 180.
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On the other extreme, the purpose of regulation effectively bypasses man
as a moral being, demanding instead his political allegiance for the common
good. As such, citizens are made the means through which the state
achieves its regulatory ends. Although penal sanctions of one sort or
another are still necessary to effectuate the state's regulatory objectives, the
offense itself does not ordinarily carry with it the social stigma that attaches
to criminal conduct. Critically, however, individuals do not incur moral
guilt on account of violating a regulation:'"9 the offense is venial. 99 It is for
this reason that dispensing with mens rea is constitutional in the
administration of the regulatory state.
Yet public welfare offenses defy easy categorization; many may be found
at the murky midpoint between an obvious good and a definite evil.
Nevertheless, one virtue above all the rest will help shed light on the judicial
inquiry-the virtue of prudence.
Prudence is a cardinal virtue,200 which may be loosely defined as practical
reason. Accordingly, prudence helps a person to apply right reason to a
specific action by "regulat[ing] the means"201 by which the object is attained.
As St. Thomas cogently explains, "it belongs to the ruling of prudence to
decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of
reason in his deeds."202 Thus, prudence has long informed the legal basis for
an action in negligence.2 03 And not only is prudence a private virtue, it is
one which may be exercised by political authority for "the common good of
198. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *57-58 (stating that offenses malaprohibita are
"without any intermixture of moral guilt" and that "conscience is no farther concerned, than
by directing a submission to the penalty").
199. Repeat offenders, however, incur a degree of culpability because these have actual
knowledge of the statutory prohibition. The same goes for first-time willful offenders with
actual knowledge.
200. See 3 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. II. pt. II. Q.47, art. 4.
201. Id. Q.47, art. 6, respondeo.
202. Id. Q.47, art. 7, respondeo.
203. Id. Q.54, art. 1, respondeo ("Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude."); see also
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Exch.) 1049 (Alderson,
B.); 11 Exch. 781, 784 ("Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.");
Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.) 493 (Lord Tindal, C.J.); 3 Bing. (N.C.)
472, 475 ("The care taken by a prudent man has always been the rule laid down...."). But
see Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) ("Negligence
in the abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at
all.").
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the multitude."1212" Indeed, a species of prudence must of necessity inform all
legislative judgment. 20 s Consequently, prudence may be employed by the
individual as a check on the power of the state, since "every man, for as
much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of
reason . . . ."206

A rule of prudence, similar to that of traditional negligence, should thus
be the chief instrument by which the object of a regulatory offense is found
either punitive or regulatory. The essential rule boils down to whether it
would be imprudent to consummate the object of the law's prohibition.
And because all human law-but especially public welfare offenses, which
are called into being by the police power-is aimed at effecting the common
good,207 it is said that "to forsake the greater good belongs to
imprudence."2 08 Therefore, where the command of prudence would
substantially coincide with the commandment of positive law, the object's
wrongfulness outweighs its indifference, and the state is justified in the use
of punishment. On the other hand, where prudence commands an alternate
(or nonexistent) course of action, the object's good or indifference
outweighs its wrongfulness, and the prohibition is thus unconstitutional
under the invalidating principle discussed above.2 09
The prudence rule is not a generic one, however. In applying the rule, the
class of persons targeted by the statute is critical to a proper determination
because prudence is not an innate human trait;210 on the contrary, it is an
intellectual habit "acquired by discovery through experience, or through
teaching."2 1 1 Consequently, the class of persons (e.g., butchers or licensed
drivers) to which the statute applies must be incorporated into the equation.
Often times, however, the act itself which constitutes the offense is
obviously morally indifferent. For instance, consider a traffic regulation
commanding that drivers shall use turn signals whenever changing lanes.

204. 3 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. II. pt. II, Q.47, art. 10, respondeo.
205. In discussing the doctrine of enumerated powers, Chief Justice Marshall said, "It
must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, so far as human
prudence could insure, their beneficial execution." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316,415 (1819) (emphasis added).
206. 3 AQUINAS, supranote 4, bk. II. pt. II. Q.47, art. 12, respondeo.
207. 2 AQUINAS, supranote 4, bk. I. pt. II. Q.90, art. 2.
208. Id. Q.90, art. 2, sed contra.
209. See supra Part IV.B.3.
210. 3 AQUINAS, supra note 4, bk. II. pt. II. Q.47, art. 15.
211. Id. Q.47, art. 15, respondeo.
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Here, we must distinguish between the object of the will and the purpose of
the regulation, which is highway safety. Thus, under these circumstances,
the offense is one step removed from the ultimate evil to be avoided. From
this basic example we derive a threshold question in the constitutional
calculus: Whether the purpose of regulation, and the attendant evils to be
thereby avoided, is one that would constitute a crime malum in se if any one
of them was the result of a willful act.212 If the answer is yes, then the
regulatory offense is presumed valid under a rational basis review-that is,
whether the means are rationally related to effectuate the legislative ends.
The burden thus rests with the challenger, who must establish that the rule
of prudence would not command substantial compliance with the
regulatory prohibition in light of the probable evils to be avoided. Note that
this is a test of exclusion, and not merely of alternate means, and thus a
form of strict scrutiny. Therefore, as one might reasonably conclude, the
traffic regulation above is a classic example of a constitutional public
welfare offense.
If, on the other hand, the purpose and evils to be avoided by regulation
would not constitute a crime malum in se if willfully committed, a
presumption of invalidity arises, and the burden rests with the state to
establish that the rule of prudence is in its favor. However, because under
these conditions the object of legislation is morally indifferent, prudence
must operate without knowledge of the regulatory purpose and the
probable evils to which it speaks. In other words, prudence must command
substantial compliance with positive law, unaided by the de facto
knowledge of an alien ethic.
In addition, two bright-line rules concerning the statutory penalty should
supplement the prudence rule, both of which create a presumption that the
law is punitive in nature. The first is any penalty resulting in a felony
conviction. The second is any penalty for which the offender is subject to a
prison term exceeding one year. The rationale behind these twin
presumptions turns on felt notions of proportionality,213 the social stigma
212. In the case of the traffic signal, one possible result of failing to signal is a fatal
accident. A person would be guilty of homicide if he drove his vehicle willfully into another
driver and killed him.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 994 ("The concept of Malum
prohibitum crime simply does not square with... such severe punishment [as up to 20 years
in prison and $5,000 fine], which is reserved for the perpetuation of Malum in se crimes.");
see also Sayre, supra note 67, at 72 ("To subject defendants entirely free from moral
blameworthiness to the possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the community sense of
justice; and no law which violates this fundamental instinct can long endure.").
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that attaches to conviction,214 and the substantial loss of rights incident
therewith.
Though relevant in deciding whether a public welfare offense is more
punitive than not, the sanction alone cannot logically dictate the difference.
Unlike the evil of the crime itself, punishments are a necessary evil and
therefore may be reduced or pardoned altogether as reason dictates. 21 5
Moreover, many traditional crimes do not carry heavy penalties, while some
public welfare offenses carry heavy fines, sometimes even lengthy prison
terms. Proportionality is nonetheless a legitimate concern, and excessively
large penalties imposed under absolute liability are likely to be invalidated
on due process grounds.'
On appeal, courts should consider the following factors in characterizing
the object of the law's prohibition: (1) whether there is any connection
between the prohibited conduct and known forms of vice; (2) whether the
offense is one which is logically derived from a common law crime; (3) the
consequences to the public welfare if the conduct was lawful; (4) the penalty
for violation; and (5) the effect of conviction on a person's political and
legal rights.
5. The Constitutional Formula
Distilling all of the above considerations results in the following four
tests:
(1) With respect to common law crimes and their derivatives, substantive
due process mandates a finding of culpability, which means the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted with the requisite
mens rea.217 Actual knowledge by the accused that his conduct was
prohibited is immaterial: the prosecution need only prove the constitutional
214. The court in Heller suggested that prison terms no greater than one year "prevent[]
the stigma and consequence of a felony conviction from attaching to the defendant." Heller,
579 F.2d at 994-95; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.") (emphasis
added).
215. See HALL, supra note 10, at 312 (discussing theories of punishment).
216. See Heller, 579 F.2d at 994 ("Certainly, if Congress attempted to define a Malum
prohibitum offense that placed an onerous stigma on an offender's reputation and that
carried a severe penalty, the Constitution would be offended...."). Cf Holdridge v. United
States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960) (discussing factors as to when the omission of mens
rea from "a federal criminal statute" is "not violative of the due process clause").
217. But see Sayre, supra note 67, at 70 ("Clearly it will not depend upon whether the
crime happens to be a common law or statutory offense.").
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minimum of willfulness,218 even where the statute is silent as to mental
elements.219
(2) Statutory offenses imposing absolute liability are presumed to violate
the First Amendment's prohibition against an established orthodoxy.
Constitutional review entails a two-part test: (A) the state must overcome
the presumption by showing that the law is rationally related to the
avoidance of evils that would constitute crimes mala in se if willfully caused.
A sufficient showing will shift the burden to the challenger, who must
establish that (B) the regulatory prohibition is an illegitimate exercise of
punitive power. In this regard, the rule of prudence asks whether the virtue
would not command substantial compliance with the regulatory prohibition
(i.e., the actus reus) in light of the probable evils to be avoided. That is,
whether the actions of a prudent person, enlightened by the regulatory
purpose and within the class of persons targeted by the statute, would not
have coincided with the commandment of positive law. Appellate courts
should look to the factors discussed above.
(3) Where the state cannot overcome the presumption of invalidity, it
must prove that prudence, unaided by the moral judgments of the state, still
commands substantial compliance.
(4) Where a conviction carries the possibility of a prison term greater
than one year, or in any event constitutes a felony, the burden of proof is
initially placed on the government, regardless of whether the regulation
passes rational-basis review. The offense is presumed to be punitive in
nature, and the government must therefore overcome the presumption of
invalidity under the alien ethics version of the prudence rule.
(5) Willful offenders are subject to constitutional conviction where it is
proved that the offender had actual knowledge of the statutory prohibition:
the actus reus. Under these conditions, punishment is always constitutional,
so long as other constitutional requirements are satisfied.
V. CONCLUSION

While the state cannot take the place of God, it does have a role to play in
the promotion of morals and the common good. To the extent the state may
criminalize conduct, mens rea is the key to lawful punishment. Crime is a
clash of wills, of which there are only two: one is man, the other is his
218. See supra Part IV.A.
219. E.g., Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 225 (1921) (interpreting a statute silent as to
mental elements as requiring only a "conscious and willing" possession in prosecution for
counterfeiting United States currency).
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Creator. In the final analysis, it is the abuse of freedom that renders all of us
amenable to punitive justice, of which even the penitent must offer
satisfaction in this life. But such abuse must first be proved, and mens rea is
the only tool we have, outside of confession, to judge the malice or
goodness of the human will. Man is a creature worthy of at least this
dignity.

